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We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policy-
motivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A block-
ade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model
to study whether early elections should be used to overcome a blockade. They
have the advantage that urgent decisions are no longer delayed, and the disadvan-
tage that unsuccessful governments gain additional time in office. This may give
rise to a time inconsistency. Voters are in favour of a constitution without early
elections. However, in the middle of a political crisis, they are willing to abandon it.
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1 Introduction
Throughout a large part of the democratic world, the timing of general elections is
flexible; that is, the government has the constitutional right to call an early election.
However, the use that is made of this right is typically controversial. For instance,
Margaret Thatcher was accused of “cutting and running” when she called an election
in 1983, shortly before the inflation rate went up, and thereby capitalized on high polls
in the nick of time. Generally, a snap election is met with criticism whenever the feeling
prevails that the reasons behind it are purely tactical.
Faced with this critique, politicians try to justify their calling of early elections.
One possible route is to argue that unexpected political developments imply that the
government needs a timely new mandate from the electorate. Alternatively, early elec-
tions are often argued to be a means of ending a political crisis. Both arguments were
used in Germany in 2005, when chancellor Gerhard Schröder called an early election.
He argued that “without a new mandate my political programme cannot be carried for-
ward” (The Independent, 2 July 2005). The German president, whose consent was
needed for an early election to take place, emphasized the country’s exigent need of a
strong government capable of enforcing needful though controversial reforms. Similarly,
Japan’s prime minister in 2005, Junichiro Koizumi, justified calling an early election
with the purpose to pursue a controversial reform (the privatization of the national
post) against the opposition in the parliament.
This shows that there are acceptable reasons for an early election, such as the
need for a new mandate or the need to overcome a political crisis, and illegitimate, or
purely tactical reasons, such as the incumbent government’s chance of winning an early
election. The question that is naturally implied by this distinction is: Are voters who
are facing an upcoming snap election able to discern whether the motives behind it are
legitimate or not?
To see the bearing of this question, suppose for the moment that the answer was Yes.
Then, voters would be in the position to punish politicians with illegitimate motives
for an early election. They would simply refrain from reelecting them. Thus, any wise
government would in turn refrain from initiating a snap election for the wrong reason;
and the problem, if there was any, would be solved by self-regulation of the democratic
system.
The situation is different if voters are not able to discern the motives behind an up-
coming snap election. An agency problem arises because politicians remain undetected
if they appeal to legitimate reasons in order to justify an illegitimate early election. In
this case, constitutional law must either allow early elections in general or ban them
in general. This raises the question about the criteria according to which such a con-
stitutional decision has to be made. How should the possibility of both legitimate and
illegitimate early elections affect the assessment of early elections at the constitutional
level?
To address these questions, this paper develops a model in which both legitimate
1
and illegitimate reasons for early elections are clearly defined, and in which a welfare
analysis of different constitutional rules can be carried out.
A sketch of the model
The following three properties of our model drive the analysis. First, a government
may be competent or incompetent in the sense that it is able to identify what policy is
in the voters’ interest. Second, there is a ruling party, whose support is important for
the government, and which consists of an office-motivated “opportunistic” wing and a
policy-motivated “ideological” wing.1 Third, the ruling party’s majority in parliament
may either be large or small.2 In the latter case, the influence of the ideological wing is
assumed to be larger because it is essential for the government’s majority in parliament.3
To illustrate the interplay of these assumptions, suppose that the reduction of un-
employment rates is the most urgent political problem and that there are two types of
policy measures that can be used. On the one hand, Keynesian policies which stimulate
macroeconomic activity and are favored by the ideologues in the left party. One the
other hand, there are policies which improve individual incentives to seek for employ-
ment, e.g., via a reduction of unemployment benefits, and which are favored by the
ideologues in the right party. Suppose that, depending on current economic conditions,
only one of these policy measures effectively reduces unemployment. We say that a
government is competent if it understands what the effective policy measure is, and is
incompetent otherwise.
In this setting, the incentives of a prime minister to call an early election depend
both on the expected success in the reduction of unemployment, and on whether the
current majority in parliament is large or small. To see this, consider the interaction
of a rational voter (he) with an office motivated prime minister (she).
The prime minister will call an early election only if she believes that her current
reelection chances are greater than they will be at the next regular election. What voters
can therefore infer from the fact that an early election takes place is that unemployment
will not go down prior to the next regular election. In principle, this may have two
reasons: Either the prime minister is not capable of reducing unemployment, i.e., she
is incompetent, or, parliament prevents the implementation of effective policies.
If the ruling party has a large majority in parliament, then there is no need to
compromise with the ideologues so that the persistence of unemployment can be at-
tributed only to the prime minister’s incompetence. By contrast, if the ruling party’s
1In Section 5 we study an extended model which makes it possible to provide a rigorous foundation
of this assumption. In particular we show that it may be optimal for a party to have an ideological
and an opportunistic wing, even if the sole objective of all party members is to be ruling as often as
possible.
2In our model, this is an equilibrium outcome that is implied by the rational behavior of voters.
3Empirically, there are of course several possible reasons why government stability may be endan-
gered by a small majority. Our model focusses on only one of them, which is inner-party conflict.
For instance, Germany’s early election in 2005 became necessary because the left wing of the ruling
social-democratic party no longer supported the government’s labour market reforms.
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majority is small, it may also be due the fact that the policy that effectively reduces
unemployment is unacceptable to the ruling party’s ideologues.
In the latter situation, the prime minister’s incentives to call an early election
depend on the voters’ beliefs, i.e., on the probability that they assign to the possibility
that she would be able to reduce unemployment if only her majority in parliament was
larger. Put differently, she can use an early election to gain additional time in office
only if the voters are confident that she is competent.
Given such beliefs, however, early elections are attractive for any prime minister,
competent or not, who knows that unemployment will not go down before the next
regular election. Moreover, early elections are more often attractive for an incompetent
prime minister than for a competent one, because the latter can occasionally reduce
unemployment, namely whenever the effective policy is compatible with the ruling
party’s ideologues. The voter must therefore rationally believe that a prime minister
who calls an early election is much more likely to be incompetent than competent.
Consequently, only if the opposition’s candidate makes an even worse impression will
the voter reelect the prime minister at an early election.
There are two conclusions from these considerations. First, the voter cannot discern
whether the motives behind a given snap election are legitimate or not. The reason
is that an incompetent prime minister can always blame the need to compromise with
the ideologues for her lack of success. Second, an early election confronts the voter
with the choice between a prime minister who is unlikely to be competent and an
alternative candidate who is even worse. This follows because the incumbent prime
minister calls an early election only if she is sufficiently likely to win. But this requires
that the opposition candidate must appear even less appealing to the voters.4 These
two insights seem plainly to imply that a constitutional ban on early elections would
be optimal from the perspective of the voter.
However, this downside is potentially counterbalanced by the fact that early elec-
tions affect the timing of political decisions. We assume that the major political ini-
tiatives of a government are undertaken shortly after an election. This assumption is
meant to capture a stylized fact. In parliamentary democracies, political activity de-
clines as the end of the legislative period approaches for a variety of reasons. Politicians
start to prepare themselves for the upcoming election, the current leaders potentially
suffer from a lame-duck effect, or the current government seeks to avoid controversies
as the next election comes closer.
Consequently, an early election implies that the next substantial political decision
is taken earlier. In our example, given that unemployment will not go down prior to
the next regular election, an early election offers the chance that the effective policy
against unemployment can be implemented immediately, rather than after the next
regular election.
These considerations show that the answer to the question whether a political consti-
4A possible reason is that the opposition party is surprised enough by the timing of the election to
be unable to produce a suitable candidate. See Smith (2004) for empirical evidence on this.
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tution should include the possibility to call an early election depends on the assessment
of a quality-urgency-tradeoff. One the one hand, it is more likely that an early election
prolongs the career of an incompetent prime minister. This gives rise to a negative
quality effect. On the other hand, urgent political decisions can be realized sooner, if
early elections are possible.
At this point, however, a new problem arises. A constitutional ban on early elections
might be unstable due to a time inconsistency. While it might be preferable from an ex
ante perspective to ban early elections by constitutional law, since the expected urgency
of political decisions might be low, a situation might arise where a political decision has
actually become very urgent. In such a situation, both the voter and the prime minister
may want to change the constitution and have a snap election; the voter because of the
urgency of the political decision and the prime minister to prolong her time in office.
Once changed, however, the constitution will remain stable. Politicians benefit from
the possibility of early elections and will hence not support a further constitutional
change. Hence, a stable constitution that precludes early election may be difficult to
achieve.
Related Literature
There are two broad categories of literature, to which our paper contributes. The first
category, obviously, is the literature on election timing. The second one, is the political
economy literature in general, to which we add a new model of political competition.
The existing literature on election timing has three branches. First, Lupia and Strom
(1995) and Diermeier and Merlo (2000) model early elections as an exogenous outside
option in parliamentary bargaining, i.e., early elections occur when there is no bargain-
ing solution. In these models, the reactions of voters to parliamentary crises are not
explicitly modelled.
Second, opportunistic election timing by politicians is analyzed by the literature on
“surfing” and “manipulation”. The literature on “surfing” models the timing of elec-
tions as a strategic reaction to exogenous movements of the polls. For instance, Keppo
et al. (2007) assume that the timing of elections is analogous to the decision about the
optimal exercise time of an American option. They derive an optimal stopping rule
for the incumbent party.5 The literature on “manipulation”, by contrast, assumes that
the ruling party can strategically influence its popularity.6 These papers, too, do not
explicitly model the behavior of voters.
The third branch of the literature on election timing is the seminal work of Alastair
Smith (Smith (1996, 2004)). Smith provides a signalling model of election timing in
which both politicians and voters are explicitly modelled. However, Smith abstracts
5For an early contribution that models election timing as an optimal stopping problem, see Balke
(1990).
6Such models are provided by some papers within the literature on political business or budget
cycles that consider flexible election terms, e.g., by Chapell and Peel (1979), Lächler (1982), and most
notably Kayser (2005).
4
from the role of early elections as a solution to a political blockade or parliamentary
crisis.
Our model links these literatures in that it has parliamentary conflicts, opportunistic
election timing, signalling and rational, forward-looking voters. Moreover, our focus
on the legitimacy of early elections distinguishes the current paper from the existing
literature. In particular, we provide a careful analysis of the welfare implications of
early elections.
The methodological contribution of our paper is the development of a dynamic
model of political competition that makes it possible to explain the existence of differ-
ent party wings and the emergence of ideological rigidities.7 With repeated interactions
and heterogeneous voters, we can show that an office-motivated party may at the same
time have a long standing loyalty to voters with extreme policy preferences and try to
gain the support of the median voter. For instance, a left party will occasionally block
policies that are very unattractive to the very leftist voters. It has an interest to do
so because otherwise the very leftist voters would abstain in future elections and the
position of the left party relative to the right party would be weakened. In other cir-
cumstances, it will implement the median voter’s preferred policy. Again this follows
from the repeated interaction of the voters and the party. If the left party won an
election because of the median voter’s support and then implemented extreme partisan
policies, then the voters surrounding the median position would refuse to vote for the
left party in the future.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple model
of political blockades. Section 3 introduces early elections to this setup. The welfare
effects of early elections are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we study an extended
model with heterogeneous voters and uncertainty about the outcome of early elections.
This makes it possible to endogenize the existence of ideological party wings. The last
section contains concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 A model of political blockades
In the following, we develop a simple model of political blockades. We assume initially
that early elections are not possible. They will be introduced in the following section.
A main feature is that a blockade is possible whenever the government is supported
only by a small majority of the members of parliament. As will become clear, the
consequence of a blockade is that a competent prime minister will not be reelected
because she is unable to prove her competence to the voters.
We first describe the actors in the political process; in particular what actions they
take and what preferences they have. We will then specify the sequence of events. Once
7An appeal to repeated interaction and ideological policy motives can also be found in Roemer
(1999), even though the latter is a static model of political competition. Moreover, Roemer (1999)
assumes rather than explains that there are different party wings.
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these preliminary steps are taken, we can turn to the equilibrium analysis.
2.1 The actors in the political process
Voters
Voter utility in period T is given by




+ ωT − pT
)2
.
gT is the per capita utility from a political decision taken at date T .
8 This utility is
reduced according to a quadratic loss function if the chosen policy, pT , does not coincide
with the ideal policy from the perspective of voters. ωT is the state of the economy in





The following terminology will prove useful. If ωT ≥
1
2
or, equivalently, p∗T ≥ 1,
then we say that the voters’ preferred policy is rightist, and leftist otherwise. Voters
wish that the chosen policy matches the state of the world. This implies, in particular,
that they prefer leftist policies over rightist policies if ωT ≥
1
2
and prefer rightist policies
over leftist policies otherwise.
The prime minister
Policy is chosen by the prime minister. We assume that, once in office, the prime
minister learns whether or not she is of the competent type (t = c) or of the incompetent
type (t = i). A competent prime minister learns ωT before making her policy proposal.
An incompetent prime minister does not observe the current value of ωT .
ωT is taken to be the realization of a random variable that is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. This implies that an incompetent prime minister is unable to




+ ωT with probability 0.
To motivate these assumptions, suppose that competence is the ability to implement
policy measures that effectively reduce unemployment. Once she has become head of
the government, the prime minister gets a more precise idea about the support and the
opposition that alternative policy measures will face because she is addressed by special
interest groups and interacts with the experts from the ministries that are responsible
for the details of policy implementation. We think of competence as an ability to deal
with this situation and finally to come up with a policy that indeed helps to reduce
unemployment. Moreover, we assume that whether or not a prime minister possesses
this competence cannot be determined before she is in office.
8As will become clear, assumptions about gT will be important for the welfare analysis of election-
timing decisions. For instance, if we set gT equal to zero, then every political decision would be a
public bad, creating only losses for voters. This extreme assumption would imply that a good political
constitution deters political decision-making. In Section 5, where we discuss the welfare implications
of early elections, we also discuss which assumptions on gT are plausible in our model.
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Formally, we treat competence as private information of the prime minister. The
consequences of her actions will possibly reveal information about her type to the
voters. However, this information is not available when a candidate for prime minister
is running for the first time. For simplicity, we assume that the prior probability that




A prime minster’s time in office is limited. She can be in office for at most two
legislative periods.9 We assume that the prime minister is primarily office-motivated.
Only if she is indifferent with respect to two alternatives that are equivalent in terms of
their implications for office holding, we assume that she prefers the one that is preferred
by the voters.
As will become clear from the equilibrium analysis, these assumptions imply that
a prime minister of the competent type wants voters to understand that she is compe-
tent in order to be reelected. However, whether this information is revealed to voters
depends on the situation in parliament.
Parliamentary Blockades
The prime minister’s policy proposals need to be accepted in parliament. We assume
that there is a ruling party and an opposition party. The prime minister is a member
of the ruling party. The opposition party’s members of parliament never support po-
litical initiatives of the prime minister. As a consequence, the prime minister’s policy
proposals are accepted in parliament if and only if the prime minister’s party approves
the prime minister’s policy choice.
We assume that there is a leftist party, L, and a rightist party, R. However, these
parties are not homogeneous. Each party has an “opportunistic” party wing which
cares about office holding and an “ideological” party wing whose members have a
specific policy preference. We do not equip the ideologues with an own payoff function
that distinguishes them from the opportunists, but just describe their behavior.10 In
particular, the ideologues from party L do not accept rightist policies, defined by pT > 1,
and the ideologues from party R do not accept leftist policies.
The relative importance of the two party wings depends on the size of the majority
that the ruling party has in parliament. We define a large majority as any situation
where the vote share of the ruling party exceeds a threshold level s > 1
2
. A small
majority is a situation where the vote share of the ruling party lies between s and 1
2
.
The size of the majority affects the prime minister’s flexibility. If the ruling party has
a large majority, then the prime minister can implement any policy she likes. However,
if the majority is small, then her policy choice is restricted. A prime minister who
belongs to party L (R) and has a small majority in parliament chooses policy subject
9The important assumption for the logic of the model is that the prime minister’s time horizon is
finite. This implies that an incumbency advantage does not last forever.
10In Section 5 we study an extended model which makes it possible provide a foundation of this
behavior. In particular, we show that it is consistent with opportunists and ideologues having the same
preference for being in office.
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to the constraint that pT ≤ 1 (pT ≥ 1), i.e., subject to the constraint that members
from the ideological party wing accept the policy proposal. More formally, a political
blockade is defined as follows: the ruling party has only a small majority in parliament
and the voters’ preferred policy is not in the prime minister’s choice set.
There are two possible interpretations of our model of political blockades. On the
one hand, we can think of it literally as referring to a majoritarian system with only two
parties, where each party has an opportunistic and an ideological wing. As argued by
Roemer (1999), the existence and the persistence of such party wings is a stylized fact in
political history. In this interpretation of the model, whether or not a majority is large
or small affects the relative position of the two party wings for inner-party bargaining
problems. We can think of a large majority as a situation such that the opportunistic
party wing has an own majority in parliament which reduces the importance of reaching
a consensus with the ideologues.11
On the other hand, we could interpret the opportunists and the ideologues on the
left, say, as different parties that occasionally form a coalition government in a system
with proportional representation. For instance, the opportunists on the left could be
interpreted as a social democratic party that enters a coalition government with the
socialists whenever they do not have an own majority in parliament. In this case,
the constraint pT ≤ 1 captures that socialists and social democrats have to find a
compromise if the left as a whole has only a small majority in parliament.12
Political Parties
In our model, political parties are important not only in parliament. They also select
candidates for elections.13 More specifically, we assume that the opportunistic party
wing is responsable for the selection of the party’s candidate, so that the party will
select the candidate with the largest winning probability in an upcoming election.
In particular, the party has to take the following decision. Suppose that the party is
currently the ruling party and that the prime minister can be nominated one more time.
Then the party has to decide wether the incumbent is nominated again or whether
she should be replaced by a newcomer. Obviously, this decision will depend on the
11In the model of Roemer (1999), a similar effect arises. He identifies the policy preference of the
ideologues with those of the party’s average voter. If in his model, say, the left party gained a large
majority because even voters to the right of the median voted for the left party, then the ideologue’s
policy preference would move closer to the median position and the preferences of the opportunists and
the ideologues would become more aligned.
12In Section 5, we study a version of the model in which voters have heterogeneous policy preferences
that can be ordered along the left-right dimension; i.e., there are voters with very leftist or very rightist
policy preferences and voters with modest policy preferences. In this extended model, we can provide
a foundation of the constraints that are implied by small majorities. There we show that, even if
all members of party L belong to the opportunistic wing, it is a best response for them to enact the
constraint p ≤ 1, because otherwise they would lose the support of voters whose preferred policy is
very leftist.
13The role of parties for the nominations of candidates has been extensively studied by Caillaud and
Tirole (2002).
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performance of the current prime minister.
We assume that the party members have the same information about the prime
minister’s competence as the voters. This assumption is consistent with our view of
competence as a specific skill that can be demonstrated on the job only; i.e., there is no
alternative way of demonstrating that a person would be a competent prime minister.
2.2 Sequence of events
We now turn to the dynamics of the model.
We assume that an election period has two time periods; e.g., if there is an election
at date T , then the next election will be at date T + 2, so that an election period
consists of the time period from date T until date T + 1 and the time period from date
T + 1 until date T + 2. A political decision is taken only in the first time period, i.e.,
in the time period starting at date T but not in the time period starting at date T + 1.
This assumption is empirically motivated. As the end of the election period ap-
proaches, politicians start to prepare the campaign for the upcoming election so that
the political activity is reduced. This implies in particular that potential utility gains
for the voters are foregone. For instance, a utility gain of gT+1 could be realized if there
was an election at date T + 1, but not if there was an election at date T .14 As will
become clear, this assumption is important for our welfare analysis of early elections,
but not for our equilibrium analysis.
The sequence of events related to an election period starting at date T is as follows:
1. Prior to the election at date T , both parties nominate a candidate. Also, the
utility gain gT from a political decision taken in the time period from T until
T + 1 becomes publicly known.
2. Elections take place, one party wins either with a large or a small majority. This
is observed by the voters. The winning party’s candidate becomes prime minister.
3. The state of the world in period T , ωT , is realized and observed by the prime
minister if and only if she is of the competent type.
4. The prime minister chooses a policy pT . Her choice is constrained if the ruling
party has a small majority.
5. Prior to date T + 1, gT+1 becomes publicly known. After date T + 1, ωT+1 is
observed by a competent prime minister. In the present model with fixed election
dates T and T + 2, this has no bearing on the equilibrium analysis.
6. Voters realize the utility generated by the political decision that was taken in the
first half of the election period.
14We do not literally assume that there are no political decisions at all in the second half of the
election period, but rather that political activities are reduced.
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7. Parties nominate their candidates for the election in T + 2 and the utility gain
gT+2 becomes publicly known.
A crucial property of this timeline is that the consequences of political decisions are
realized only after some delay. Voters learn in the second half of the election period
whether the political decision taken in the first half of the election period was a good




+ ωT − pT
)2
,
or a bad decision.
The motivation of the assumption that there is a time lag between the choice of
policies and the date at which they become effective is as follows. Policy measures are
often controversial on the date at which they are taken. However, as time goes by, it
becomes clearer whether or not the policy is successful in reaching a given objective;
e.g., the reduction of unemployment.
The size of the loss is a signal of the prime minister’s competence. For instance,
if the loss is equal to zero, this implies that the prime minister is competent with
probability 1, because an incompetent prime minister does not observe ωT and has a
zero probability of picking the policy that matches the state of the world. However, if
the loss is not zero, then things are not as clear-cut. For instance, there might be a
probability that the prime minister is competent but could not implement the policy
that yields to a loss of zero because of a blockade in parliament. In this case, the
loss is only a noisy signal about the prime minister’s competence, and voters update
their beliefs after observing the loss. The equilibrium analysis below will endogenously
determine the beliefs of voters.
The information about the success or failure of policy, as measured by the loss func-
tion, is available when parties decide about their candidates for the next election. In
particular, the ruling party’s decision whether or not to nominate an incumbent prime
minister a second time is therefore influenced by the size of the loss in the previous
period and the voters’ assessment of the prime minister’s competence.
We assume that this sequence of events is infinitely repeated. This implies that our
analysis is not driven by end round effects. Voters and parties are infinitely lived, and
future payoffs are discounted according to a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). Given that there
is an election at date T , the expected utility of a voter as of date T is written as
UT = E[δuT + δ
2UT+2],
where uT is the utility from the political decision taken in period T and UT+2 is the
expected life-time utility at the date of the next election. Likewise, the preferences of
the opportunists in party j are given as
V
j







where vjT = 1 if party j is the ruling party over an interval from T until T + 1, and
v
j
T = 0 otherwise.
E denotes an expectations operator. Expectations are taken with respect to future
political events which in turn depend on the time series properties of the primitives
gT and ωT . For simplicity, we assume that (gT )
∞
T=0 is a sequence of independent
and identically distributed random variables with support [0, ḡ] and expected value ge.
(wT )
∞
T=0 is also a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables
that are uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
2.3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibria of the game. The solution concept
is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which requires that the strategies of voters, parties
and the prime minister are mutually best responses for given beliefs about the prime
minister’s competence and that beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
We also impose a condition of stationarity so that equilibrium play is the same for two
subhistories of the game that differ only in calendar time. Also, we omit time indices
if this creates no confusion.
Finally, we need some assumptions on voting behavior. Generally, game-theoretic
treatments of voting decisions give rise to multiple Nash equilibria. For instance, if
almost everyone votes for party L, then a single individual may vote for either party
because he cannot influence the outcome of the election anyway. Hence, there is both
a Nash equilibrium where this voter votes for party L and a Nash equilibrium where
he votes for party R.
In elections with only two possible outcomes, e.g., a victory for L versus a victory
for R, only one of those many equilibria survives the elimination of weakly dominated
strategies. In our model, however, a voting decision has four possible outcomes (a large
majority for L, a small majority for L, a large majority for R or a small majority for
R) so that we cannot rely on the elimination of dominated strategies. We therefore
impose the following assumptions on the voting behavior of individuals.
Assumption 1 If a large majority for one of the parties is the best outcome from the
perspective of voters, then every voter votes for this party.
Assumption 1 implies that voters manage to coordinate in such a way that their pre-
ferred equilibrium results. For instance, if all voters prefer a large majority for R over
a small majority for R, a large majority for L, and a small majority for L, then the
assumption says that all voters vote for party R and, as a result, that the majority for
party R will be large.
Assumption 2 If all voters are indifferent between a large majority for L and a large
majority for R as well as between a small majority for L and a small majority for R,
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then each voter votes for party L with probability 1
2
.
Assumption 2 concerns a situation where voters have no preference for either of the
parties. In this case, it is assumed that each voter votes with equal probability for
either party. Since the number of voters is large, the law of large numbers implies that
the vote shares of the parties will almost surely be very close. Hence, a situation where
all voters are indifferent leads with probability 1
2
to a small majority for L, and with
with probability 1
2
to a small majority for R.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is a stationary perfect Bayesian
equilibrium with the following properties:
• Policy Outcomes: If the prime minister is incompetent, then the policy outcome
is p = 1. If the prime minister is competent, then the policy outcome is p = 1
2
+ω,
if there is no political blockade, and p = 1, otherwise.
• Nomination Decisions: The ruling party in T nominates the prime minister for
the election in T + 2 only if pT =
1
2
+ ωT , i.e., and only if she has proven to be
competent.
• Election Outcomes: The prime minister runs for a second term only if she has
proven to be competent. In this case her party wins a large majority. Otherwise,
both parties nominate a newcomer, and the outcome is a small majority for L or
a small majority for R, with equal probability.
The prime minister always has an incentive to move as close to the voters’ ideal policy
as possible. If she is in her second and last term office motivations do no longer play
a role so that she chooses the policy that is best for voters. If she is in her first term
she can achieve a second nomination only if the policy matches the state of the world,
so that p = p∗. If this outcome is out of reach because of a lack of competence or a
blockade, she makes the proposal that is best for the voters under these circumstances,
p = 1.
If the prime minister has proven to be capable of generating high utility for voters,
i.e., if p∗ has been implemented, then voters will reward this ability with a large majority
in the subsequent election. This implies that the prime minister will be nominated for a
second term because the party’s main motivation is to rule as often as possible. Finally,
given that the prime minister’s majority is large, she will no longer have to compromise
with the ideological party wing.
By contrast, if the previous policy was p = 1 then the ruling party nominates a
newcomer to avoid a large majority for the opposition party. The logic is as follows:
the outcome p = 1 may either be due to a blockade or due to the prime minister’s
lack of competence. If previously there was a blockade, nothing can be learned from
the policy outcome so that the posterior belief on the prime minister’s competence,
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conditional on a blockade, is equal to the prior belief of 1
2
. If there was no blockade,
then the conditional probability that the prime minister is competent equals 0. Hence,
the probability that the prime minister is competent, conditional on p = 1, is bounded
from above by 1
2
. Now suppose the prime minister would run against a newcomer from
the opposition party. The newcomer’s probability of competence is equal to 1
2
and,
moreover, he is able to deliver the good outcome p∗ in two subsequent periods, which
would be the unique Pareto-dominant outcome. As a consequence, even if the prime
minister and the newcomer had the same probability of being competent, the voters
would prefer the newcomer because he is younger. Therefore the opposition party’s
candidate would be strictly preferred by the voters and win with a large majority.
The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 is not unique. However, it is the
one we are interested in because of the consequences of a political blockade: First, a
competent prime minister has no way of distinguishing herself from an incompetent
one and will not be rewarded with a second term. Second, voters cannot realize the
gains from having a competent prime minister.
3 Early elections
We now extend the model of the previous section and assume that the prime minister
has the option to call for an early election in T +1. In such an early election, the prime
minister will compete against a newcomer from the opposition party.
Given our assumption that a politician can run only twice, early elections are costly
in the sense that they reduce a prime minister’s maximal time in office from four time
periods to three periods.15 However, we have seen in the previous section that in case of
a political blockade a prime minister will be replaced by a newcomer after two periods.
Consequently, a call for early elections is an attractive option for the prime minister if
she can thereby get three instead of two periods.
We assume that the prime minister decides on early elections based on the public
opinion about the competence of the government and the opposition party. In a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, the beliefs about the prime minister’s competence at the date of
an early election are pinned down by Bayes’ rule. For the opposition party, we model
the competence assessment as a probability k that the party’s candidate in an early
election would be competent. k is publicly observable. For simplicity, k can only take




, and kH =
5
6
.16 As will become clear, kL =
1
6
implies that, at the date
of an early election, the probability that the prime minister is competent is twice the
15This assumption is not essential for the main results. We also analyzed a specification of the model
where candidates may also run in the regular election following an early election. In this case, early
elections make it possible to expand the maximal time in office from four time to five periods. The
qualitative results do not depend on this modelling choice.
16There exist critical values k̂L and k̂H such that our results go through, whenever kL ≤ k̂L and
kH ≥ k̂H . A characterization of these critical values is straightforward, but requires lengthy derivations.
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probability that that the opposition party’s candidate is competent, given that the
opposition party is weak.
Empirically, there is always survey data available that gives the standing of the
ruling party relative to the opposition party. We think of k = 1
6
as indicating a situ-
ation where the opposition party is weak. For instance, suppose that the opposition
party does not currently have a strong leader and that a call for early elections implies
that the opposition party has less time for the nomination process than in a regular
election.17









































E indicates dates at which regular elections take place. At date T + 1, the prime minister decides
whether or not to have an early election. The figure also illustrates the flow of information, i.e., the
dates at which the values of ω and g are drawn, the dates at which political decisions are taken, p, and
the dates at which the consequences of the decisions are realized, u. Finally, the letter N marks the
dates at which parties decide about the nomination of candidates.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events if early elections are possible. At date T ,
there is a regular election. Prior to date T +1, k is observed. Based on this information
the prime minister decides whether early elections (EE) take place. The figure also
shows that an early election changes the sequence of dates at which political decisions
are taken, and thereby also the sequence of utility realizations. For instance,
uT+1 =
{





+ ωT+1 − pT+1
)2
, if EE in t + 1.
Proposition 2 There exists a cutoff-value δ̂, so that for all δ ≤ δ̂ there is a stationary
perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
• Policy Outcomes, Nomination Decisions, and the outcome of regular elections are
as in Proposition 1.
17Smith (2004) analyzes early elections in the United Kingdom and comes to the conclusion that the
weakness of the opposition party is a necessary condition for an early election: “(...) early elections
are between incompetent governments and ill prepared challengers” (p. 61).
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• Early Elections: there are early elections if and only if k = 1
6
, and the prime
minister is incompetent or there is a political blockade. The prime minister’s
party wins and gets a large majority.
The equilibrium is such that both a competent prime minister who faces a blockade
and an incompetent prime minister initiate early elections if the opposition party is
weak. They can thereby avoid being replaced by a newcomer in T +2 and stay in office
until T + 3.
The intuition for this result is as follows: If a prime minister is blocked she cannot
prove her competence prior to the next regular election. She may, however, call for
an early election and hope that voters are sufficiently confident that she is competent
and reelect her. However, the consequences of political decisions are realized only after
some delay. This creates an incentive for an incompetent prime minister to prolong her
government by imitating a competent one who calls for early elections. Early elections
are thus initiated by every incompetent prime minister and by the competent ones
who are blocked. Consequently, the probability that the prime minister is competent
is lower in an early election than in a regular election with two newcomers. Formally,
Bayes’ rule implies that conditional on early election taking place, the probability that
the incumbent is competent equals
Pr{t = c,blockade}
















This is larger than 1
6
so that the prime minister is more likely to be competent than
the newcomer and wins with a large majority if the opposition party is weak.18
The existence of the equilibrium in Proposition 2 requires that the discount factor δ
does not exceed a threshold level δ̂. This is due to the fact that in an early election
the prime minister can run for only one additional legislative period and the newcomer
can run for two legislative periods. Hence, if both candidates were equally likely to be
competent, the newcomer would be more attractive for the voters because, in case of
being competent, the latter can deliver the good outcome p∗ twice. If δ is low enough,
then the prime minister’s competence advantage dominates this effect so that she will
win in an early election.
There are other stationary perfect Bayesian equilibria than the one described in Propo-
sition 3. Most importantly, the equilibrium without early elections that has been
characterized in Proposition 1 survives the modification of the model.
Proposition 3 For all δ, there is a stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that
the prime minister never calls for early elections. Nomination decisions and policy
outcomes and the outcome of regular elections are as in Proposition 1.
18In Section 5, we study an extended model that has probabilistic voting results and in which an
early election may be lost by the incumbent.
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If the voters interpret an early election as indicating that the prime minister is incom-
petent, then the prime minister has no incentive to initiate them because she would
lose her office otherwise. Consequently, neither an incompetent prime minister nor a
blocked prime minister opts for early elections.
It is straightforward to show that there is no equilibrium that has political blockades
and in which the use that is made of early elections distinguishes an incompetent prime
minister from a blocked competent one. Formally, there is no equilibrium that is fully
separating, in the sense that the action “early elections” is chosen only by a competent
or an incompetent type. Suppose, for instance, that only competent prime ministers
call for early elections. In such an equilibrium, conditional on an early election taking
place, voters would know that the prime minister is competent and reelect her. But
then the incompetent type would have an incentive to mimic the competent type and
also initiate an early election. Otherwise her incompetence would be revealed prior to
the next regular election and she would not get a second nomination. With similar
arguments, we can show that there is no equilibrium in which only an incompetent
prime minister initiates early elections. This contradicts the existence of a separating
equilibrium. We summarize this reasoning in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 There is no equilibrium in which early elections occur and in which
the decision to initiate an early election fully reveals the prime minister’s type.
This result implies that there is no objective criterion that would make it possible to
distinguish an early election that is beneficial for voters (because the current prime
minister is competent and should be given the chance to enlarge her support in par-
liament) from one that has detrimental consequences (because an incompetent prime
minister can gain additional time in office).
In Germany, for instance, the federal president is asked to decide whether an early
election is legitimate because the stability of government might be endangered. In our
model, such a distinction can be made retrospectively, but not at the date of the regular
election. It therefore makes no sense to delegate the assessment of an early election
to anyone who is an outsider to the political process, such as the supreme court or, in
some countries, the president. The remaining alternatives are either a clause that says
early elections are generally possible, or a clause that says they are not. In the next
section, we compare these two alternatives from a welfare perspective.
4 Welfare Analysis
Proposition 4 implies that there are only two consistent ways of treating early elections
at the constitutional level, either they are generally possible (as, for instance, in the
United Kingdom), or they are generally impossible (as, for instance, in Switzerland and
Norway). This raises the question which of these two alternatives is better from the
16
perspective of voters.
In the following, we answer this question by means of a comparison of the utility
of voters in an equilibrium where early elections are never initiated, as in Proposition
1, and in an equilibrium where they are initiated by an incompetent or a blocked
government whenever the opposition party is weak, as in Proposition 2.
We first compare these equilibria from an ex ante perspective that we define as
a situation prior to an election with two newcomers and prior to learning the next
period’s level of g. In the Appendix (Lemma 1) we derive the following expression for
voter utility UN in an equilibrium without early elections:
























µN is a weight on the average utility gain from political decisions ge and νN is a weight
on the average value of the loss function that is implied by an incompetent political
decision.19 Analogously, we derive the following expression for voter utility UE in an
equilibrium with early elections (Lemma 5):
































Straightforward algebraic manipulations establish the following result which we state
without proof.
Corollary 1 For all δ ∈ (0, 1), µE > µN and νE > νN .
According to Corollary 1, the welfare comparison of the two equilibria gives rise to
an urgency versus quality tradeoff. Early elections give more weight both to ge, the





, the loss due to incompetence of the
prime minister. With early elections, there will be more policy decisions. Simultane-
ously, the average quality of political decisions declines. The latter effect arises because
without early elections an incompetent prime minister is replaced by a newcomer after
two periods. With early elections, by contrast, she can stay in office for three periods.
Given this tradeoff, voters prefer the equilibrium with early elections if and only if the
expected gains ge from policy making are sufficiently high. This observation implies
that the following corollary holds.
19To see that the average loss is equal to 1
12
, note that an incompetent prime minister chooses p = 1













Corollary 2 There is a cutoff value ĝe such that UE > UN if and only if ge > ĝe.
We now look at the urgency versus quality tradeoff from an interim perspective. More
precisely, we study the following question: suppose that there was a regular election at
date T and that the gain from having a political decision in period T + 1, gT+1, has
been revealed. Suppose there is a status quo constitution that does not allow for early
elections. Now suppose that the policy in T has been pT = 1 and that the opposition
party is currently weak. Suppose the government initiates a referendum about the
question whether the constitution should be changed in such a way that from period
T + 1 on early elections are allowed, with the understanding that this implies that the
equilibrium will be as in Proposition 2, i.e., an incompetent or a blocked government
calls for early elections whenever the opposition party is weak.
If the status quo constitution prevails, then the utility of voters is δUN because
there will be a regular election with two newcomers in T + 2. By contrast, if early













is the probability that the prime minister is of the incompetent type in an equi-
librium with early elections. We obtain the following Corollary that we state without
proof.
Corollary 3 There is a cutoff value ĝ such that voters are in favor of early elections
ex interim if and only if the short run utility gain g from a political decision satisfies
g > ĝ.
Propositions 1 and 3 imply that the welfare comparison of the two equilibria may give
rise to a time inconsistency. From an ex ante perspective, it is decisive how large the
average utility gain ge from a political decision is. From an interim perspective, it also
matters how much utility can be gained in the short run. If the utility gain is small
on average, then the voters may prefer to have a constitutional ban on early elections
ex ante. However, if ex interim they find themselves in a situation where a lot can
be gained, they are willing to abandon this constitution in order to have an election
immediately. Moreover, once the possibility of early elections has been established,
it will be difficult to remove it again. Politicians benefit from the possibility of early
elections and have no reason to seek a further constitutional change, after the political
crisis has been overcome. These considerations show that it is difficult to establish a
stable constitution, i.e., one that is not bound to be changed, that entirely precludes
early elections.
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5 An extended model
We will now study an extended version of the model in Section 3 and introduce two
new elements. First, we introduce heterogeneity among voters. This extension implies
that there are indeed voters who benefit from political blockades and whose support is
important for the parties. We can thereby endogenize the constraint that a left party
does not implement a rightist policy if its majority in parliament is fragile. More for-
mally, we no longer restrict the parties’ strategies with respect to the decision whether
or not they accept the prime minister’s policy proposals and show that the parties have
a reason to enact political blockades in equilibrium.
Second, we model election campaigns as a source of randomness such that the
outcome of an election is no longer perfectly predictable. For instance, if both parties
nominate a newcomer, then there is a probability that one candidate will outperform
the other in the pre-election phase and win with a large majority. Also, we assume that
voters can choose to abstain from an election. As will become clear, these extensions
make our model more realistic in that there are two types of elections. On the one
hand, there are elections where it is important for the parties to get enough support
from the voters with extreme policy preferences. For instance, if the very leftist voters
abstained and the very rightist participated in the election, then party R would win.
This creates an incentive for the left party to fight for the votes of the very left. On
the other hand, there are races where the focus is on the voters in the middle, and the
winning party is successful in getting the support of all voters that are close to the
median.
Finally, we show that with probabilistic voting outcomes early elections may be lost
by the incumbent. As documented by Smith (2004) early elections are frequently lost
by the incumbent, so that it is important for the empirical plausibility of our model
that such an event is possible in equilibrium.
Voter utility in period T is now given by
uT (θ) = gT − (θ + ωT − pT )
2 ,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the voter’s type. The preferred policy of a type θ voter is p∗(θ) = θ+ω.
Assumption 3 The distribution of voter types has full support. Moreover, there is
a well-defined political middle that contains a majority of voters: there is ǫ < 1
2
such
that 1 > G(1
2
+ ǫ) − G(1
2
− ǫ) > 1
2
.
Assumption 3 implies that there is a fraction of voters with extreme policy preferences.
For instance, the ideal policy of a voter of type 0 is bounded from above by 1, i.e.,
whatever the state of the economy, a very leftist voter never has an ideal policy, p∗(0),
that exceeds 1. In addition, there is a neighborhood of the median voter that contains
a majority of voters. If a party succeeds in getting the votes from these voters, then
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it will end up having a large majority in parliament. Moreover, we assume that voters
in the middle manage to coordinate if a large majority for one of the parties is their
preferred outcome.
Assumption 4 If a large majority for one of the parties is the best outcome from the




+ ǫ], then all of these voters vote for
this party.
We assume that the prime minister’s preference has the same structure as in Section
2, i.e., the prime minister is primarily office-motivated. However, she has a policy
motivation that breaks ties between alternatives that have the same implications for
office-holding. We assume that her policy preference now coincides with the policy
preference of the median voter θ = 1
2
. The interpretation of this assumption is that
even if the prime minister has no need to please the median voter in order to increase
her reelection probability, she behaves “opportunistically” in the sense of maximizing
the support of her policy proposals in the general public.20
Prior to any election there is an election campaign in which one candidate may out-
perform the other one – in the sense that in the view of the voters he seems to be
more likely to be competent – or in which the two candidates tie. The outcome of the
election campaign will influence the result of an election and in particular whether the
winning party has a large or a small majority.
Formally, we model the outcome of an election campaign as the realization of a
random variable β which takes values in {−1, 0, 1} and is generated as follows: β =
αL − αR, where αL and αR are independent random variables that take the values 0
and 1 with the following probabilities
Pr(αj = 1 | tj = c) = Pr(αj = 0 | tj = i) = η ,
where tj ∈ {c, i} is the type of party j’s candidate. We assume that η ∈ (1
2
, 1) so that
a competent candidate is more likely to get a good signal, αj = 1, and an incompetent
one is more likely to get a bad signal, αj = 0. Voters do not observe αL and αR. They
only get a signal β of the relative competence of the candidates. The informational
content of β depends on the prior beliefs of individuals on a candidate’s type. For
instance, if two newcomers compete, then both are ex ante equally likely to be of type
c. If voters observe that β = 1, then the conditional probability that the candidate
from party L is competent exceeds the conditional probability that the candidate from
party R is competent. If β = 0, then both are equally likely to be of type c, etc.
20Given that the median voter’s preferred policy is a unique Condorcet winner, we can define oppor-
tunism equivalently as the objective to minimize the number of voters who prefer an alternative policy
over the policy proposal of the prime minister.
20
The extended model can be solved analytically.21 However, for ease of exposition
we impose in the following the assumptions that δ = 1
2
and η = 3
4
. This allows us to
use numerical methods – as opposed to lengthy algebraic manipulations of inequalities
– in order to illustrate the properties of the equilibria we are analyzing.
For the same reasons as in the previous section, a constitution that enables a prime
minister to initiate early elections in the middle of a legislative period gives rise to mul-
tiple equilibria. The following Proposition characterizes an equilibrium, where early
elections do never arise. In this equilibrium, voters would interpret an early election
as indicating that the prime minister must be incompetent so that the prime minister
would lose with probability 1.
Proposition 5 Let δ = 1
2
and η = 3
4
. Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 4, there is a
stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
• Political Blockades: If Party L (R) has a small majority it accepts the prime
minister’s policy proposal if and only if p ≤ 1 (p ≥ 1). Otherwise it accepts any
policy proposal.
• A prime minister never initiates early elections. Policy Outcomes and Nomination
Decisions are as in Proposition 1.





+ ω. In this case her party wins with a large majority. If both parties
nominate a newcomer, then the outcome is a small majority for L or a small
majority for R, with equal probability, if β = 0. If β = 1, party L wins with a
large majority and if β = −1 party R wins with a large majority.
Proposition 5 establishes that political blockades are part of an equilibrium with het-
erogeneous voters. Otherwise, it establishes the same results as Proposition 1, except
that there is a richer set of election outcomes: An election where both parties nominate
a newcomer does not necessarily have a winning party with a small majority. If one
candidate appears superior in the election campaign, her party will win with a large
majority.
The fact that voter preferences are heterogeneous implies that there are indeed
voters who benefit from a political blockade. Figure 3 shows the voter types who prefer
a small majority over a large majority for party L. These voters have extreme policy
preferences and hence prefer the constraint p ≤ 1 to be in place.
Given the preferences of voters, we can explain the parties’ behavior when deciding
about the prime minister’s policy proposals and, in particular, why small majorities
give rise to political blockades. The formal proof in the Appendix uses standard folk
21In the appendix, we explicitly derive all expressions that are relevant for a characterization of
equilibrium.
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Figure 2: A large majority for L vs a small majority for L







Llc(θ) is the expected utility of voter type θ conditional on a large majority for the left party and a
competent prime minister. Lsc(θ) is expected utility conditional on a small majority and a competent
prime minister. A small majority implies that the prime minister cannot choose policies p > 1.
theorem arguments to establish that the left party will enforce the constraint p ≤ 1
whenever it has only a small majority in parliament: If a deviation from p ≤ 1 implied
that the very left voters would abstain in future elections and that the right party
would therefore become more likely to win, then it is a best response for the party not
to accept any policy proposal p > 1.
The interpretation of this result is that the left party has an implicit contract with
the leftist voters. If the left party came into power only because of the support of
the very left and then implemented a policy that is good for the voters in the middle
but bad for the very left, then the latter will no longer support the left party. In the
long run, this has detrimental consequences for party L so that it wants to honor this
implicit contract.
A similar argument can be used to show that, whenever the left party has a large
majority, it seeks to move as close to the median voter’s ideal policy as possible. If
party L won a large majority because it got all the voters in the middle and then
implemented partisan policies that would benefit only the very left, then the voters in
the middle would respond to this breach of contract by switching to party R in future
elections.
We now show that there is also an equilibrium that is an analogous to Proposition
2. In particular, a competent prime minister who is blocked and an incompetent prime
minister call for early elections whenever the opposition party is weak.
Proposition 6 Let δ = 1
2
and η = 3
4
. Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 4 there is a
stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following properties:
• Political Blockades, Policy Outcomes, Nomination Decisions, and the outcome of
regular elections are as in Proposition 5.
• Early Elections: There are early elections in T + 1 if and only if the preceding
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history is as follows. In T there is a regular election with two newcomers, which
ends with a small majority, β = 0. Moreover, the opposition party is weak, k = 1
6
,
and the prime minister is incompetent or there is a political blockade. Suppose
the prime minister belongs to party L (R). L (R) wins and gets a large majority
only if β = 0, or β = 1 (β = −1). Otherwise the opposition party wins and gets
a large majority.
Proposition 6 extends Proposition 2 to a model with heterogeneous voters and prob-
abilistic election outcomes. In particular, the prime minister may lose in an early
election. It is rational for her ex ante to call for an early election because she is likely
to win. Ex post, however, she may regret this choice. If the candidate of the opposition
party outperforms the prime minister in the election campaign, then indeed the former
will win. Formally, if the prime minister belongs to party L and the election campaign
has β = −1, then the posterior beliefs of the voters are such that the candidate from
party R is more likely to be competent.
Moreover, after an early election there is always a large majority for the ruling
party. Hence, early elections make it possible to overcome a political blockade. The
reason is that, for voters in the middle, a large majority for the party with the more
competent candidate is their preferred outcome. By assumption, these voters form a
large majority so that their preferred outcome prevails.
Welfare Analysis
We now generalize the welfare analysis that we conducted for the basic model in Section
4. In particular, the extended model makes it possible to answer two additional ques-
tions: (i) how does the preference for early elections depend on a voter’s type and (ii)
what are plausible magnitudes for the advantages and disadvantages of early elections?
In the Appendix, we solve for the expected utility of a voter with type θ in an
equilibrium without early elections, UN (θ), and in an equilibrium with early elections,
UE(θ), from an ex ante perspective. Again we can decompose these expressions into
an urgency and a quality measure and write,
UN (θ) = µ̄Nge − ν̄N (θ) and UE(θ) = µ̄Ege − ν̄E(θ).
Using numerical methods,22 we can show that for δ = 1
2
and η = 3
4
,
µ̄E > µ̄N and ν̄E(θ) > ν̄N (θ), for all θ.
This implies that the urgency versus quality tradeoff that we derived for the basic model
in Section 4 carries over to the extended model. Early elections lead more frequently
to political decisions but also to a lower quality of politicians.
Our answer on the question how different voter types assess this trade-off is based
on the observation that ν̄E(θ) − ν̄N (θ) is an increasing function of | θ − 1
2
|. Hence,
22See Figure 3 below.
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the quality disadvantage that is implied by early elections becomes stronger the further
away a voter’s type is from the median. This is a consequence of the quadratic loss
term in the utility function. Large deviations from a voter’s ideal policy get more
weight. Since equilibrium policy is oriented towards the median, utility losses are more
pronounced for voters with extreme policy preferences. In particular, this implies that
if the median voter prefers a constitutional ban on early elections, then every other
voter shares this preference. Put differently, a constitutional ban on early elections is
Pareto-preferred over a constitution that makes early elections possible if and only if
it is preferred by the median voter.
The following graph shows the utility difference UN (θ)−UE(θ) under the assump-
tion that ge = 1
16
. Given this value, almost every voter type, with the exception of
those in a small neighborhood of the median, would prefer a constitution that precludes
early elections.
Figure 3: Utility without early elections vs utility with early elections







UN (θ) is the expected utility of voter type θ from an ex ante perspective in an equilibrium without
early elections. UE(θ) is expected utility in an equilibrium with early elections. The graph is drawn
under the assumption that ge = 1
16
.
Given the specification of our model, it is reasonable to assume that 0 ≤ ge ≤ 1
12
. The
assumption ge ≥ 0 implies that, on average, a competent political decision that max-
imizes the median voter’s utility, p = p∗(1
2
), is better for the median than not having
a political decision which would yield a payoff of 0. The assumption ge ≤ 1
12
implies
that, on average, an uninformed political decision, p = 1, is bad for the median in the
sense of yielding a utility level that is below 0.
The assumption that ge ≤ 1
12
implies that the very leftist and the very rightist
voters are better off in the equilibrium without early elections. We can thus conclude
that one has to assume implausibly high values of ge to arrive at the conclusion that
it is in the interest of all voters to have a constitution with early elections. For the
median voter, the result is not as clear-cut. Approximatively, the median voter prefers
the equilibrium with early elections if ge ≥ 1
16
and prefers the equilibrium without early
24
elections otherwise.23
These considerations can be summarized as follows. Only the case where ge ≤ 1
16
allows for a ranking of alternatives according to the Pareto-criterion. In this case, all
voters are, from an ex ante perspective, against a constitution with early elections. For
1
12
≥ ge ≥ 1
16
, voters in the middle want to have early elections and voters with extreme
policy preferences oppose them.
6 Concluding Remarks
We provided a formal analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of early elections
in a model of political competition between a left-wing and a ring-wing party. If the
ruling party has only a small majority in parliament, then the government may be
unable to implement the policies that would be beneficial to a majority of voters. The
government may therefore initiate an early election in order to get a broader support
for its agenda.
Our analysis has investigated the consequences of early elections in comparison to
an alternative constitution under which early elections are not possible. It has been
shown that this comparison reveals an urgency versus quality tradeoff. Early elections
make it possible to implement policies that otherwise could not be chosen and this is
beneficial from the perspective of voters. On the other hand, early elections enable
politicians who do not have a promising agenda to gamble for additional time in office,
and this is detrimental from the perspective of voters. An assessment of this tradeoff
depends on the utility gain that voters realize, on average, from the political decisions
that are made possible if early elections take place.
However, an ideal political constitution in our model would be such that whether or
not an early election can take place depends on the importance of the political decisions
that currently have to be taken. If, for instance, a war is taking place, then it may be
more urgent to overcome a political crisis than otherwise.
Our model does not allow such conditioning on political circumstances. Either early
elections can always take place or they are entirely excluded. We think this is a realistic
approach with respect to real-world constitutions. Moreover, it is questionable whether,
in a richer model, it would be desirable to condition the availability of early elections on
the need to overcome a political crisis. This need can be manipulated by the politicians
themselves, both in terms of rhetoric and political actions. For instance, prior to the
early election in Germany in 2005, it was argued that the importance of a labor market
reform and, generally, a better macroeconomic performance made a further phase of
political stagnation untenable. After the election, however, the political agenda had
changed and, if anything, the labor market reforms that had been initiated prior to
the early election were rolled back. Moreover, the moral hazard problem may be more
drastic, if instead of adjusting its rhetoric, a government chooses actions (or remains
23If we assume that, on average, p = p∗( 1
2









inactive) so that a country’s situation becomes sufficiently bad and then tries to take
advantage of an early election.
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A Proofs of the Propositions in Sections 2 and 3
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof proceeds in two steps. We first derive an expression for the expected utility of
voters in the hypothesized equilibrium (Lemma 1). Subsequently, we verify the claims made in
Proposition 1 (Lemmas 2-4).
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Lemma 1 Suppose that Proposition 1 is true. Then the expected utility, UN , of a voter prior



















where UNj is expected utility conditional on a victory of party j ∈ {L, R}. Since the prime








where UNjt is expected utility conditional on a victory of party j and prime minister type
t ∈ {c, i}. Since a type i prime minister chooses p = 1 and is not nominated again,















+ δ2UN , (6)
for each j.
Now suppose that the prime minister is competent and belongs to party L. Then, if ω ≥ 12 the
policy is p = 1 and the subsequent election is one with two newcomers. If ω ≤ 12 , then p = p
∗
and the prime minister can prove that she is competent. She will thus be nominated again and
gain a large majority implying that




































Along the same lines we derive that
UNLc = UNRc . (8)
Equations (4)-(8) imply equation (3).
Lemma 2 Suppose that the ruling party nominates the prime minister for a second election
only if she previously generated the outcome p = p∗. Then, the policy outcome in any period
is p∗ if the prime minister is competent and if there is no blockade, and p = 1 otherwise.
Proof First, suppose the prime minister is in her last term so that she chooses policy in
order to maximize the voters’ utility. An incompetent prime minister cannot condition on the
current value of ω, and chooses p in such a way that the voters expected utility is maximized.
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A competent prime minister can observe ω and moves as close to the voters ideal policy as
possible. This yields p∗ if there is no blockade and p = 1 otherwise. Now consider a prime
minister in his first term. She can ensure a second nomination only if she is competent and
there is no blockade and if she proposes pT = p
∗
T . In all other cases she will not be nominated
again and the best admissible policy for voters is pT = 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose a candidate has already proven to be competent and competes against a
newcomer. Then the competent candidate is nominated by her party and wins with a large
majority.
Proof From the perspective of voters, large majorities are always preferred over small ma-
jorities because they do not give rise to political blockades. Hence, we only need to show that
all voters prefer the outcome “large majority for the competent candidate” over the outcome
”large majority for the newcomer”. If the competent candidate gains a large majority, this
yields an expected utility of δgT + δ
2UN for the voters. If the newcomer gains a large majority,
















It is straightforward to show that this expression is smaller than δgT + δ
2UN , for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
Hence, a large majority for the competent candidate is the unique Pareto-dominant outcome
and she will win a large majority. This is the preferred outcome of her party so that she will
be nominated.
Lemma 4 In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a prime minister whose party had a small major-
ity in the previous period is nominated for a second term if and only if p = p∗ in the previous
period.
Proof Suppose to the contrary that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that a prime
minister whose party had a small majority in the previous period is nominated for a second-term
even though p = 1. We will show that this leads to a contradiction, because, under Assumption
1, all voters will vote for the newcomer so that the ruling party would be better off if it also
nominated a newcomer.
Suppose first that there was no blockade in the previous period. Consequently, it must be true
that the ruling party’s candidate is of type i. If she is reelected, the expected utility of voters,





irrespective of whether the majority is large or small. If the newcomer is elected with a large
















It is straightforward to verify that this exceeds the expected utility if the candidate of the ruling
party wins and also the utility that could be realized with a small majority for the newcomer.
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Now suppose that there was a blockade in the previous period. Hence, the ruling party’s
candidate is of type c with posterior probability 12 . Since voters prefer large majorities over
small majorities we only need to show that, conditional on a blockade, a large majority for the























It is straightforward to show that this holds for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof proceeds in two steps. We first derive an expression for the expected utility of
voters in the hypothesized equilibrium (Lemma 5). Subsequently, we verify the claims made in
Proposition 2 (Lemmas 6-15).
Lemma 5 Suppose that Proposition 1 is true. The expected utility, UE , of a voter in an equi-
librium with early elections prior to an election where both parties are nominating a newcomer





























where UEj is expected utility conditional on a victory of party j ∈ {L, R}. Since the prime








where UEjt is expected utility conditional on a victory of party j and prime minister type
t ∈ {c, i}. A type i prime minister chooses p = 1 and initiates early elections whenever k = 16 .
























Now suppose that the prime minister is competent and belongs to party L. Then, if ω ≥ 12 the
policy is p = 1 and there is an early election with probability 12 . If ω ≤
1
2 , then p = p
∗ and the
prime minister can prove that she is competent. She will thus be nominated again and gain a
large majority implying that


















(δ2ge + δ3UE) . (13)
Along the same lines we derive that
UELc = UERc . (14)
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Equations (10)-(14) imply equation (9).
Lemma 6 Given the behavior of voters in early and regular elections and the nomination
decision of parties, we can find off-the-equilibrium beliefs such that, in any period where a
political decision is taken, the policy outcome is p∗ if the prime minister is competent and if
there is no blockade, and p = 1 otherwise.
Proof If the prime minister is in her second period, this follows because she seeks to maximize
the voters’ utility. Now suppose she is in her first period.
If she is competent and there is no blockade, proposing p∗ implies that she will be nominated
again and reach the maximum time in office because her type will be revealed prior to the next
regular election.
Now suppose she is incompetent or there is a blockade. Let the beliefs of voters be such that,
if an early election takes place following a policy p 6= 1, this indicates that the prime minister
is incompetent with probability 1. Then the prime minister can not increase her reelection
chances in an early election by deviating from the equilibrium policy p = 1.
Alternatively, an incompetent or blocked prime minister may choose p = 1 and not initiate
early elections. The subsequent election is a regular election. If the off-the-equilibrium belief
is such that the prime minister is competent with a probability less than 12 , then the prime
minister’s party prefers to nominate a newcomer
Finally, she may choose p 6= 1 and not initiate early elections. Again, if off-the-equilibrium
beliefs ares such that the prime minister is competent with with a probability less than 12 , then
she will not be nominated again.
Lemma 7 Consider a regular election in T +2 where the prime minister can be nominated for
a second term. It is optimal to nominate the prime minister if and only if pT = p
∗.
Proof If pT = p
∗ then it has been revealed that the prime minister is competent. If she is
nominated her party wins a large majority. In equilibrium, if pT = 1 and there has not been an
early election in T + 1, the probability that the prime minister is competent is weakly smaller
than 12 : if there had been no blockade the posterior probability of competence is 0, otherwise
it is equal to 12 . Consequently, if the prime minister competed against a newcomer, the latter
would win with a large majority. The details of the argument are as in the proofs of Lemmas
3 and 4.
Lemma 8 A prime minister who is competent and does not face a blockade does not initiate
early elections. Consider a prime minister who is incompetent or blocked. If k = 56 , then off-the
equilibrium beliefs can be chosen such that the prime minister does not opt for early elections.
For k = 16 , the prime minister chooses early elections provided that δ does not exceed a critical
value δ̂.
Proof If the prime minister is competent she can reach the maximum time in office if and
only if she proposes p∗ and does not initiate early elections. In the following, consider a prime
minister who is incompetent or blocked.
In the hypothesized equilibrium, incompetent and blocked prime ministers call for early elections
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whenever k = 16 . Bayes’ rule implies that conditional on the events “early elections take place”
and k = 16 the probability that the prime minister is competent equals
Pr
{





Pr{t = c, blockade}















Consequently, if k = 16 , the voter in T + 1 gets an expected payoff of π
I
EE from electing the








































It is easy to show that πIEE > π
N
























For δ sufficiently small, the right hand side is negative. Hence, πIEE > π
N
EE for all g
e so that
all voters have a strict preference for the prime minister. If off the equilibrium beliefs are such
that the prime minister would not be nominated again in a regular election in T + 2, then it is
optimal to call early elections because the prime minister can stay in office for three instead of
two periods.
Consider the case k = 56 and suppose the prime minister would call early elections. Suppose
voters have off-the-equilibrium beliefs such that the probability that the prime minister is
competent is again equal to 13 . Then voters prefer the newcomer, since he is both younger
(i.e., reelectable) and more likely to be competent than the incumbent. Hence, prime minister
prefers to stay in office until the next regular election.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose off-equilibrium beliefs are such that whenever the incumbent calls for early elections,
voters and party members believe her to be incompetent with probability 1. These beliefs imply
that the incumbent does never call for early elections. The remainder of the proof follows from
proof of Proposition 1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose first that a competent prime minister can choose a policy that reveals her competence
to the voters prior to the next regular election. Then the prime minister will be nominated for
a second time and get a large majority because in her last period she maximizes voter utility.
If the equilibrium is such that a competent prime minister can always implement such a policy,
this implies that she has no incentive to initiate early elections because she can be sure to reach
the maximal time in office. But this implies that an early election could only be called for by
an incompetent prime minister. But then an early election who would be lost and will not be
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initiated.
Now suppose that there are political blockades which imply that a competent prime minister
can not reveal her type to the voters. Moreover suppose there is a separating equilibrium such
that early elections are either triggered by an incompetent prime minister or by a competent
but blocked prime minister. If only the incompetent one calls for early elections, voters will not
elect her. Thus, it is not the incompetent type who calls for early elections. However, if only
competent and blocked prime ministers call for early elections, they will be elected, and the
incompetent type has an incentive to deviate and to call for early elections too. It follows that
a fully separating equilibrium in pure strategies with early elections does not exist.
B Proofs of the Propositions in Section 5
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds in three steps. We first compute the utility of voters in the hypothesized
equilibrium (Lemma 9). For the second step, we take it as given that political blockades occur
and show that the prime minister’s policy proposals, the party’s nomination decisions and
the behaviour of voters are mutually best responses (Lemmas 10 - 12). In the final step, we
endogenize the political blockade (Lemmas 13 and 14).
Lemma 9 Suppose that Proposition 5 is true. The expected utility, UN(θ), of voter type θ
prior to an election where both parties are nominating a newcomer and prior to learning the


















where pc(θ) = (θ − 12 )
2 is the expected per period utility loss given that p = p∗(12 ) and
pi(θ) = pc(θ) + 112 is the expected per period utility loss given that p = 1.
Proof We first compute the continuation utility UN(θ) of a voter with type θ prior to an
election campaign (i.e., before observing β) where both parties nominate a newcomer and prior
to observing the next period’s realization of g.
Suppose that both parties compete with a newcomer. We will verify below that β = 1 (β = −1)
implies that party L (R) wins with a large majority and that β = 0 implies that either party
wins with probability 12 and has only a small majority in case of winning. It is straightforward




[Ll(θ) + Ls(θ) + Rs(θ) + Rl(θ)] (16)
where Ll(θ) is the continuation utility if party L wins with a large majority and Ls(θ) is the
continuation utility that applies if the majority is small. Rl(θ) and Rs(θ) are defined in the
same way.
The payoff given that party L wins with a large majority is based on expectations about the
prime minister’s type conditional on the event β = 1,
Ll(θ) = pr(tL = c | β = 1)Llc(θ) + pr(tL = i | β = 1)Lli(θ)
= ηLlc(θ) + (1 − η)Lli(θ) .
(17)
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Llc(θ) (Lli(θ)) is the expected continuation utility conditional on the events β = 1 and tL = c
(tL = i). In the hypothesized equilibrium, a competent prime minister stays in office for two
periods because in case of having a large majority he can reveal his type during his first term
with probability 1. This implies






2dw = (θ− 12 )
2. By contrast, an incompetent politician stays
in office for only one period. Since his type becomes common knowledge the party nominates
a newcomer in the next regular election. This implies




(θ + w − 1)2dw = 13 (θ
3 − (θ − 1)3).
If party L wins with a small majority, then, the continuation utility Ls(θ) is given by





where Lsi(θ) = Lli(θ) because the behavior of an incompetent politician does not depend on
the size of the majority. By contrast, a competent politician can choose p = 12 + w if w ≤
1
2
and has to choose p = 1 otherwise. Hence,
Lsc(θ) = pr(w ≤ 12 )L
sc










Lscb (θ) is the continuation utility that applies if the president is blocked. In an equilibrium
without early elections,
Lscb (θ) = δ(g − p
Lc
b (θ)) + δ
2U(θ) . (22)




(θ + w − 1)2dw = 13 (θ
3 − (θ − 12 )
3) is the expected utility that is realized if
the president is blocked.
Along the same lines one can derive the corresponding expressions for Rs(θ) and Rl(θ). Sub-

















Taking the political blockades as given, it follows from Lemma 2 that the policy outcome in
any period is p∗(12 ) if the prime minister is competent and if there is no blockade, and p = 1
otherwise.
Lemma 10 Consider a regular election where two newcomers are running. Party L (R) wins
with a large majority if and only if β = 1 (β = −1). If β = 0, then the winning party has a
small majority, and each party wins with probability 12 .
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Proof
Case 1. Suppose the election campaign ends with a signal in favor of the left candidate β = 1.
We show in the following that, conditional on this event, for a majority of voters a large majority
for party L is the preferred outcome of the election. All graphs are drawn under the assumption
that g = 14 .
Step 1. Consider first the comparison between a large majority for party L and a large majority
for party R. Given the posterior beliefs, the expected utility if L wins a large majority is given
by Ll(θ) whereas the expected utility if party R wins a large majority is given by
(1 − η)Rlc + ηRLi ,
where the symmetry of equilibria implies that Rlc = Llc and Lli = Rli. Hence, a voter of type
θ prefers a large majority for L over a large majority for R if and only if Llc(θ) − Lli(θ) > 0.
The following graph shows that this statement is true for all θ. Hence, all voters prefer a
large majority for the more competent candidate over a large majority for the less competent
candidate.
Figure 4: A large majority for L vs a large majority for R following β = 1







Step 2. We now investigate the set of voters who prefer a large majority for party L over a
small majority for party L. The expected utility if party L wins a small majority is given by
ηLsc + (1 − η)Lsi ,
where in an equilibrium without early elections Lsi = Lli. Hence, a voter of type θ prefers a
large majority for L over a small majority for L if and only if Llc(θ) − Lsc(θ) > 0. Figure 5
shows that this statement is true for all θ ≥ 0.31, that is only the voters whose ideal policy is
very left benefit from a blockade.
Step 3. Using the same arguments as in Step 2, we find that all voters with types θ ≤ 0.69
prefer a large majority for party R over a small majority for party R . By Step 1 all voters
prefer a large majority for L over a large majority for R. Hence, we can conclude that a all
voters with types θ ≤ 0.69 prefer a large majority for party L over a small majority for party
R.
We conclude from Steps 1 - 3 that all voters with types between 0.31 and 0.69 prefer a large
majority for party L over any alternative outcome of the election. Assumption 3 implies that
this is a majority of voters. Assumption 4 implies that these voters vote for party L.
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Case 2. A symmetric argument establishes that party R will win with a large majority if
the election campaign ends with a signal in favor of the right candidate β = −1.
Case 3. Suppose that β = 0. Then, the posterior beliefs of the voters are such that both
candidates are equally likely to be competent. Moreover, both parties behave identically in
case of winning a large majority, implying that all voters are indifferent between a large ma-
jority for L and large majority for R. Consequently, a voter of type θ prefers a small majority
for party L over a small majority for party R if and only if Ls(θ) ≥ Rs(θ). A straightforward
calculation shows that these are all voters with an ideal policy to the left of the median, i.e.,
all voters with θ ≤ 12 .
We now show that an incumbent who had the opportunity to prove that he is competent in the
previous period will win with a large majority if he runs again.
Lemma 11 Suppose an incumbent has proven to be of type c. If nominated again, she will
win with a large majority.
Proof Consider an election where an incumbent from party R who has proven to be of type
c and runs again. If she is reelected with a large majority, a type θ voter realizes utility
OCl(θ) := δ(g − pc(θ)) + δ2U(θ).
If the candidate from the left party has a good signal, β = 1, then the expected payoff from a
large majority for party L equals Y Gl(θ) := ηLlc(θ) + (1 − η)Lli(θ). Since Llc(θ) > Lli(θ) this
is an upper bound for the expected payoff that is realized if L gains a large majority.
The following graph shows that OCl(θ) > Y Gl(θ) for all θ. Hence, all voters prefer a large
majority for the incumbent over a large majority for the newcomer, whatever the outcome of
the election campaign.24
The set of voters who prefer a large majority for the incumbent over a small majority for the






2UN (θ)). Straightforward computations show that these are the voters with
θ < 0.632.
We can use the arguments from the proof of Proposition 10 to argue that all voters with θ > 0.31
prefer a large majority for the incumbent over a small majority for the left party. In summary,
all voters with types between 0.31 and 0.632 prefer a large majority for the incumbent over
any other outcome. By assumptions 3 and 4 this implies that the incumbent wins with a large
majority.
Now suppose that the policy outcome has been p = 1. From the perspective of voters this
indicates that either there has been a blockade – conditional on this event the prime minister is
competent with probability 12 – or there has not been a blockade and prime minister is incom-
petent with probability 1. The arguments in the proof of Lemma 4 imply that in this situation
all voters with preferences in a neighborhood of the median would prefer a large majority for
24The inequality OCl(θ) > Y Gl(θ) can be manipulated analytically to obtain an upper bound on
η. If η was very close to 1 then the new candidate would be almost as likely by of type c as the
incumbent. Moreover, the new candidate has the advantage of being able to run in two consecutive
elections. Hence, for η very close to one OCl(θ) > Y Gl(θ) does not hold. By contrast, assuming that
η = 3
4
implies that a competent incumbent will always win against a newcomer.
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Figure 5: A large majority for a competent incumbent vs. a large majority for a new
candidate with a good signal









the newcomer over any other outcome if the prime minister was nominated again, which implies
that the prime minister’s party prefers to nominate a newcomer. This is summarized in the
following Lemma, which we state without proof.
Lemma 12 Suppose an incumbent has implemented p = 1. If nominated, the other candidate
will win with a large majority.
We now turn to the incentives of parties to enact political blockades. Without loss of generality,
we study only the incentives for the left party. We first derive the left party’s payoffs in











L ) , (24)
where SLlL is the expected payoff of party L conditional on winning a large majority in a regular
election where two newcomers are running. SLsL is the expected payoff in case of winning a
small majority. SRlL and S
Rs
L are the payoffs of the left party if the right party wins. We have
that
SLlL = η(1 + δ + δ





(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3 + δ4TL) +
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2
(1 + δ + δ2TL)
SRlL = ηδ









Substituting these expressions into (24) yields
VL =





2 − (η + 1
2











Intuitively, this is the present value of an infinite stream of expected per period payoffs of 12 ,
where 12 the probability to be in office in any one period.
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Lemma 13 Suppose L has a small majority. It is optimal for the party to block any policy
p ≥ 1 if it expects that otherwise leftist voters would abstain in the future whenever there is
an election where both parties nominate a newcomer and β = 0.
Proof Suppose there is an alternative equilibrium where leftist voters abstain whenever β = 0
and, as a consequence, party R gains a large majority whenever β = 0. In all other cases voting
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(1 + δ) + 1
2
η(δ2 + δ3)
2 − (η + 1
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Assuming that a deviation affects future play of leftist voters, the maximal utility that the left
party can obtain by deviating from blocking any policy p ≥ 1 is given by
1 + δ + δ2 + δ3VLA .
This is based on the assumption that the party can win the next regular election by deviating.
Thereafter, the party has to nominate a newcomer and from then one the new equilibrium payoff
becomes relevant. By contrast, if the party honors its implicit contract with leftist voters, then
the payoff is given by
1 + δVL .
Straightforward calculations show that for η = 34 and for δ =
1
2 we have that
1 + δVL > 1 + δ + δ
2 + δ3VAL .
This implies that the left party has no incentive to deviate.
Using the same argument, one can show that it is not in the party’s interest to deviate from
moving as close as possible to the median voter’s preferred policy. Suppose that the party
and the president would consider a deviation such that in one period a policy that is optimal
for voters with types to the left of the median is implemented. If this implies that in future
elections all voters in a neighborhood of the median vote for party R whenever the race is close,
such a deviation is not attractive.
Lemma 14 Consider a deviation of party L that yields a short run gain for leftist voters. If
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this implies that in the future voters in the middle vote for party R whenever there is an election
where both parties nominate a newcomer and β = 0, then such a deviation is not attractive.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 6
The proof proceeds in three steps. We first consider the incentives for a prime minister to call
for early elections. Lemma 15 shows that it may happen that after the early election, voters
consider the opposition party’s candidate to be more competent. Lemma 16 shows that the
prime minister nevertheless wants to call an early election even if the opposition party has a
chance to win. Second, we derive voter utility in the hypothesized equilibrium (Lemma 17).
Finally, we indicate the steps that are required to complete the proof, i.e., to verify that the
hypothesized behavior constitutes indeed a stationary perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The following Lemma provides a characterization of the beliefs of voters after an early election
as a function of the outcome of the election campaign, β′, preceding the early election. For ease
of notation we suppress that all probabilities are conditional on the events that early elections
take place, that k = kL and that the preceding regular election had β = 0. Conditional on these
events, the probability that the prime minister is competent equals 13 , as in the basic model in
Section 3.
Lemma 15 Suppose the prime minister belongs to party L. If η = 34 , then
pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) > pr(tR = c | β′ = 0)
if β = 1 or β = 0, and
pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) < pr(tR = c | β′ = 0)
if β = −1.
Proof
Case 1. Suppose that β = 0. By definition of a conditional probability
pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) =
1
3pr(β




pr(β′ = 0) =
1
3
pr(β′ = 0 | tL = c) +
2
3
pr(β′ = 0 | tL = i) (30)
Moreover, the assumption that αL and αR are independent random variables implies that
pr(β′ = 0 | tL = c) = η[kη + (1 − k)(1 − η)] + (1 − η)[k(1 − η) + (1 − k)η] (31)
and
pr(β′ = 0 | tL = i) = (1 − η)[kη + (1 − k)(1 − η)] + η[k(1 − η) + (1 − k)η] (32)
Combining equations (29) - (32) yields
pr(tL = c | β′ = 0) =
1
3{2η(1 − η) + k(2η − 1)
2}
− 13k(2η − 1)
2 + 23{(1 − η)




pr(tR = c | β′ = 0) =
kLpr(β




pr(β′ = 0 | tR = c) =
1
3








{η2 + (1 − η)2} +
2
3
{2η(1 − η)} (35)
Combining equations (30)-(32) to solve for pr(β′ = 0) and equations (34) and (35) yields





2 + (1 − η)2} + 23{2η(1 − η)}
]
− 13k(2η − 1)
2 + 23{(1 − η)
2 + η(1 − η) + η2}
(36)
It follows from equations (36) and (33) that






6 , it follows that pr(t
L = c | β′ = 0) > pr(tN = c | β′ = 0).
Case 2. Suppose that β′ = 1. Using the same arguments as in Case 1, we derive









3η(1 − η) +
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3 (2 − η){k(1 − η) + (1 − k)η}
(38)
It follows that,
pr(tL = c | β′ = 1) > pr(tN = c | β′ = 1) ⇐⇒ k <
η2
2 + 3η2 − 4η
.




6 . It follows that pr(t
L = c | β′ = 1) > pr(tN = c | β′ = 1).
Case 3. Suppose that β′− = 1. Using the same arguments as Case 1, we derive















3 (1 + η){kη + (1 − k)(1 − η)η}
(40)
It follows that,
pr(tL = c | βEE = −1, EE, k) > pr(tN = c | βEE = −1, EE, k)
⇐⇒ k <
(1 − η)2
(1 − η)2 + 2η2
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6 . Hence, pr(t
L = c | β′ = −1) < pr(tN = c | β′ = −1).
Lemma 16 Suppose the prime minister belongs to party L. Suppose there is a blockade or
that the prime minister is incompetent. Suppose that k = kL and that the preceding regular
election in period T had β = 0. Suppose that the prime minister would not be nominated again
if there was a regular election in T + 2. Suppose that the prime minister will win an early
election if and only if β 6= −1. Then it is optimal for the prime minister to call for an early
election.
Proof If the prime minister does not initiate early elections, her payoff as of period T + 1
equals 1 because she can stay in office until T + 2. If she wins an early election her expected
payoff equals (1 + δ)pr(β′ 6= −1 | tL) because in case of winning she stays in office until T + 3
and loses her office otherwise. Suppose first that tL = i. Then,
pr(β′ = −1 | tL = i) = kLpr(β
′ = −1 | tR = c, tL = i)
+(1 − kL)pr(β
′ = −1 | tR = i, tL = i)
= kLη
2 + (1 − kL)η(1 − η)
Hence, an incompetent prime minister calls for early elections if
(1 + δ)(1 − kLη
2 − (1 − kL)η(1 − η)) > 1
With δ = η = 34 and kL =
1
6 , this condition is fulfilled.
Now suppose that the prime minister is competent, then
pr(β′ = −1 | tL = c) = kLη(1 − η) + (1 − kL)(1 − η)
2
which is strictly smaller than pr(β′ = −1 | tL = i). Hence a competent prime minister also opts
for early elections.
Lemma 17 The expected utility, UE(θ), of voter type θ prior to an election where both parties
are nominating a newcomer and prior to learning the next period’s g equals
UE(θ) =




































































































αc := pr(β′ = −1 | tL = c) = 1 − kLη(1 − η) − (1 − kL)(1 − η)
2,
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is the probability that a competent incumbent wins an early election and
αi := pr(β′ = −1 | tL = i) = 1 − kLη
2 − (1 − kL)η(1 − η),
is the probability that an competent incumbent wins.
σc := pr(β′ = −1, tR = c | tL = c) = kLpr(β
′ = −1, | tR = c, tL = c) = kLη(1 − η),
is the joint probability that the incumbent loses and that the newcomer is competent given that
the incumbent is competent, and
σi := kLη
2,
is the joint probability that the incumbent loses and that the newcomer is competent given that
the incumbent is not competent. Analogously, the joint probability that the incumbent loses
and that the newcomer is incompetent is given by
γc := (1 − η)2(1 − kL),
if the incumbent is competent and by
γi := η(1 − η)(1 − kL),
if the incumbent is incompetent. Finally λ = 12 is the probability that k = kL =
1
6 .
Proof An election where both nominate a newcomer leads to a large majority for party L (R)
if β = 1 (β = −1) which happens with probability 14 . Conditional on β = 0 either party has an




[L̄l(θ) + L̄s(θ) + R̄s(θ) + R̄l(θ)] (42)
where L̄l(θ) is the continuation utility if party L wins with a large majority and L̄s(θ) is the
continuation utility that applies if the majority is small, etc.
In case of winning with a large majority, there is no political blockade. Hence,
L̄l(θ) = ηL̄lc(θ) + (1 − η)L̄li(θ) , (43)
where
L̄lc(θ) = (δ + δ3)(g − pc(θ)) + δ4UE(θ) , (44)
and
L̄li(θ) = δ(g − pi(θ)) + δ2UE(θ) , (45)
Again by symmetry L̄l(θ) = R̄l(θ).
If party L wins with a small majority, then, the continuation utility L̄s(θ) is given by
L̄s(θ) = 12 L̄
sc(θ) + 12 L̄
si(θ) , (46)
where






b (θ) , (47)
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where L̄scnb is the continuation utility that applies if ω ≤
1
2 and there is no blockade, and L̄
sc
b
is the continuation utility that applies otherwise. If there is no blockade, a competent prime
minister can prove his competence which implies that
L̄scnb(θ) = L̄
lc(θ) (48)
Let λ be the probability that the opposition competence equals k so that the incumbent initiates
early elections. With probability 1 − λ there is no early election but a regular election where
both parties nominate a newcomer. Hence,
L̄scb (θ) = δ(g
e − pLcb (θ)) + (1 − λ)U
E(θ) + λXc, (49)
where
Xc := αc[δ2(ge − pc(θ)) + δ3UE(θ)] + σcδR̄lc(θ) + γcδR̄li(θ)
Analogously, we derive
L̄si(θ) = δ(ge − pi(θ)) + (1 − λ)UE(θ) + λX i (50)
where
X i := αi[δ2(ge − pi(θ)) + δ3UE(θ)] + σiδR̄lc(θ) + γiδR̄li(θ)
The expressions for party R are derived in the same way. Substituting all of the resulting
expressions into (42) und using that pLcb (θ) + p
Rc
b (θ) = p
i(θ) establishes the Lemma.
The remaining steps to complete the proof of Proposition 6 are similar to those for the proof
of Proposition 5. We therefore only sketch the arguments.25 We first verify that Lemma
10 also holds in the current setting. The arguments and the results are exactly the same as
in the proof of Lemma 10. We further verify that an early election is indeed such that the
incumbent wins with a large majority if β 6= −1 and that the opposition party wins with a
large majority otherwise. Therefore it is necessary to use the appropriate posterior beliefs on
candidate competence when computing expected utility conditional on the outcome of the early
election campaign and to adjust for the fact that the incumbent has a shorter time horizon than
the newcomer. Given these modifications, the arguments and the results which characterize the
outcome of early elections are same as in the proof of Lemma 10. Finally, we show that also
Lemmas 11-14 go through.
25Details are available from the authors upon request.
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